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“HELPLESS” GROUPS
Troy A. McKenzie*
“Courts of equity have a tradition of aiding the helpless, such as infants,
idiots and drunkards. The average security holder in a corporate
reorganization is of like kind.”1

INTRODUCTION
This Essay considers the idea of the “helpless” group—that is, the group
comprising individuals who are thought to be incapable of protecting their
own interests. That idea plays a particularly important role in the history of
the modern class action, which has been justified as a device providing
redress for “small claims held by small people.”2 The helpless group is at
once hero and victim. The group serves as champion of the law by seeking
to vindicate its rights.3 At the same time, the group may be preyed upon by
the party opposing it and, potentially, by its own counsel. Indeed, courts,
whether in the class action4 or in the new world of nonclass aggregate
litigation,5 are called upon to give special protection to the helpless group
for that reason.
But the rhetoric of helplessness can be muddled and contradictory. It is
muddled because it collapses a number of different concepts that should be
explored separately. Sometimes, the image of the helpless group is invoked
when discussing a group of individuals who are not helpless in the ordinary
sense of the word. They may be fully capable of participating in the
litigation but are rationally indifferent to it—either because they hold
negative value claims or because the group’s claims are, for idiosyncratic
reasons, ones that individual group members may not wish to pursue. At
other times, the image of the helpless group is invoked to justify searching
judicial oversight of lawyers. The rhetoric of helplessness under those

* Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. Jerome Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate
Reorganization, 19 VA. L. REV. 541, 569 (1933).
2. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98 (1967) (discussing
opt-out classes).
3. Id.; see also William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 714 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002).
5. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491–94 (E.D.N.Y.
2006).

3213

3214

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

circumstances serves principally to highlight the perceived failings of
counsel owing a fiduciary obligation to the group.
There is also a contradictory side to the image of helplessness. It can
hobble aggregation in many cases where the group is most able to give
voice to its preferences and to push back against the misdeeds of its
lawyers. Precisely when a group shows evidence of being something other
than defenseless, that evidence may be used to disfavor group litigation.6
Mass tort class actions, for example, were attacked in part because they did
not fit the perceived image of helpless individuals who needed the
protection of a group litigation device.7 This is not to say that we should
ignore any of these considerations. Rather, the underlying concerns at play
in assessing the needs of claimants, their opponents, and the civil justice
system should be laid bare.
This Essay draws from the development of bankruptcy law and,
specifically, from the law governing business reorganizations. Bankruptcy
serves as a case study in the rhetoric of helplessness. Odd as it may seem,
the concern about helpless individuals corralled into a group and preyed
upon by their adversaries and their own lawyers originated in bankruptcy
before it made its way to the world of the class action. The system of
business reorganization that developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries—the equity receivership—relied heavily on the participation of
committees representing various classes of creditors and equity holders
during the negotiated resolution of a firm’s financial distress. In theory,
those committees acted on behalf of the groups they represented, although
in practice they were often dominated by the insiders who controlled the
reorganization process—corporate debtors’ managers, bankers, and
lawyers.
To highlight the exploitation of security holders in large business
reorganizations, reformers emphasized the isolation and helplessness of the
typical creditor, such as a bondholder with a small stake in the
reorganization.8 During the New Deal, those reformers successfully

6. See, e.g., Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 496 & n.28 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(describing the litigation as “Goliath versus Goliath” and concluding that a class action
would not be superior to other means of adjudication).
7. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm
Misplaced, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 581 (1994) (“[M]ass tort cases do not pit downtrodden,
defenseless claimants against such big, impersonal governmental institutions as prisons,
school systems, and mental health facilities.”).
8. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for
What?, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 114 (1935) (describing the concern that “the average small
bondholder, not knowing where else to turn in his need of finding someone who would act
for him,” could be manipulated by those who controlled the reorganization process); Roger
S. Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization, 44 YALE L.J. 923, 948 (1935) (“It is
probable that in many instances the reorganizers counted on the ignorance and inertia of
scattered bondholders, and upon extra-legal pressure to compel general acceptance of . . .
[the reorganizers’] plans.); Frank, supra note 1, at 568 (“The bulk of the security holders [in
a reorganization] are inevitably uninformed and usually concur in a plan presented to them
by the reorganizers because of lack of information and lack of any practical alternatives.”).
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overthrew the receivership and replaced it with a form of business
reorganization that strictly limited the participation of formal, representative
committees of creditors.
The reformers’ justification for that radical change was that individual
creditors were so ill equipped to monitor the process that creditors’
committees would, inevitably, fall prey to the machinations of insiders.9
Rather than design a more robust committee system that attempted to
counterbalance insider control and thereby give creditors more say in the
process, the reformers abandoned group representation in large corporate
bankruptcies. Instead, the reforms aimed to replace the committee system
with a single guardian—a neutral trustee—under the supervision of an
administrative agency (the SEC).10
The result was a failure. The “reformed” bankruptcy process that
emerged from the New Deal era proved to be unsatisfactory to debtors and
creditors alike. Rather than facilitating the resolution of firms’ financial
distress, the reforms made it much more difficult because bargaining among
the various interests at stake became too unwieldy without the mediating
influence of organized committees.11 When the bankruptcy system
underwent its next major overhaul in the 1970s, the New Deal approach to
corporate reorganizations was abandoned in favor of a return to a
(modified) pre–New Deal model of group resolution.12
This historical note has implications beyond bankruptcy. The early
academic thinking that shaped the current form of the class action was
heavily influenced by the New Deal era bankruptcy reformers. Indeed, the
seminal law review article about the class action, written shortly after the
New Deal overhaul of the bankruptcy system, began with a discussion of
the problem of the individual creditor in a business reorganization case.13
A number of lessons can be drawn from the bankruptcy experience of
group organization. First, it is necessary to pierce through the rhetoric of
the helpless group in order to appreciate what features of a particular group
of individual claimants are thought to render them unable or unwilling to
participate effectively in litigation. The New Deal reformers assumed that
small investors holding small claims in corporate bankruptcies would be
indifferent to the running of the case.14 They failed to recognize, however,
the heterogeneous nature of the community of creditors in a large
bankruptcy case. Second, greater attention should be paid to ways in which
the voice of groups can be harnessed effectively.15 When the New Deal era
9. See infra Part I.A.1.
10. See infra Part I.A.2.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684–85 (1941).
14. See infra Part I.A.1.
15. There are, of course, scholars who have given careful study to that problem. See
generally, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2008);
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations,
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reforms of the bankruptcy system were abandoned, creditors’ committees
were reintroduced as a form of monitor and as a semi-legislative outlet for
claimants. There is much to criticize in the use of creditors’ committees
today in bankruptcy, but the more recent history of the committee system
demonstrates that they play a valuable role in enhancing the group
resolution process in bankruptcy cases. The class action, on the other hand,
remains inhospitable to forms of organization that draw on subgroup
representation of the same sort.16 Nevertheless, the developing form of
procedural aggregation that lies outside the formal certification of a class
action may once again open the doors to rethinking group representation.
I. THE HELPLESS GROUP AND PROCEDURAL REFORM
In 1941, Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield wrote perhaps the most
influential law review article on the class action.17 Published shortly after
Hansberry v. Lee,18 the Supreme Court’s landmark decision on due process
in representative suits, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit
explored routes for reforming the class action.19 The article provided as its
principal insight a model of the class as a group with a shared interest,20 a
conceptual innovation that the authors offered as a challenge to the more
limited traditional view of the proper role of class suits.21 The model put
91 B.U. L. REV. 87 (2011) [hereinafter Burch, Litigating Together]; Jack B. Weinstein, The
Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451
(2012); see also Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as
Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863.
16. To be sure, claimants are not completely voiceless in class actions, as the role of
individual objectors demonstrates.
17. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13. For a discussion of the article’s influence, see
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield
Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 603 (2008); Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights
Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1978–79 (2004).
18. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
19. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 701–07 (criticizing the then-current
version of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
20. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109,
1128 (2011) (discussing Kalven and Rosenfield’s model of the class action); see also
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
232 (1987) (observing that Kalven and Rosenfield “embrace[d] the interest definition of the
class, requiring no more than an (assumedly) shared interest in recouping losses”).
21. Kalven and Rosenfield heaped particularly harsh criticism on the then-recently
promulgated Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—or, at least, on the
interpretation of the Rule offered by Yale Law School Professor J. W. Moore, who was one
of its drafters. Moore, a bankruptcy scholar as well as an expert on civil procedure, insisted
that the 1938 version of the Rule contemplated only three types of class actions depending
on the preexisting legal relationship among the class members. 2 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 2235 (1st ed. 1938). Moore called these three categories the “true” class
action, in which members of the class held a joint or common right; the “hybrid” class
action, in which the class members’ rights were several but involved claims to property that
required common distribution or management; and the “spurious” class action, in which the
class action served as a permissive joinder device. Id. at 2235–41. Kalven and Rosenfield
showed that these categories were unhelpful in achieving the desired end of effective and
inclusive group resolution, because they either duplicated existing procedures or applied
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forward by Kalven and Rosenfield sought to give a realistic assessment of
the dynamics of widely dispersed groups of claimants who lacked prior
communal ties. When those groups comprised individuals who, although
sharing a common interest, were “isolated, scattered, and utter strangers to
each other,” a procedural intervention was necessary to bring them together
and make recovery possible.22
Ultimately, the authors settled on the solution of a reformed class suit,
brought by any one member of the class without the need to solicit other
class members’ consent, with an emphasis on the benefits of maximizing
the inclusion of claimants.23 Before reaching that conclusion, however,
Kalven and Rosenfield first considered a model of group organization
drawn from business reorganization cases—the committee—and rejected it.
Why they did so has a fascinating historical explanation that deserves to be
retold.
A. The Helpless Group in Bankruptcy
Those who have not recently re-read Kalven and Rosenfield’s seminal
work probably do not recall that it begins with an examination of
developments in bankruptcy law.24 That was not as odd then as it may
seem now. When Kalven and Rosenfield first advocated broader use of the
class action in 1941, the law of corporate reorganizations had recently
undergone a massive reworking, driven by the perceived mistreatment of
the individual investor in bankruptcy cases. The SEC had undertaken a
lengthy investigation of corporate reorganizations in the 1930s, and the
agency’s report, whose final part was published one year before Kalven and
Rosenfield’s article, painted a grim picture of security holders
systematically exploited by corporate debtors and those who controlled the
group resolution process of corporate reorganizations.25 The SEC Report
recounted the plight of “the single and isolated security holder” who was, in
most cases, “helpless in protecting his own interests or pleading his own
cause.”26 Kalven and Rosenfield chose that quotation from the SEC Report
to frame the opening passages of their article.27
only to cases of limited importance. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 705 (“[T]he
rule performs three functions as interpreted by Moore. That of the ‘true’ class suit, no one
any longer cares about; that of the ‘hybrid’ suit is well taken care of through another
procedure entirely, and the ‘spurious’ simply duplicates a task already performed by another
section of the rules.”).
22. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 688.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 684.
25. SEC REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES,
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1936–
1940) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]. Congress directed the SEC to produce the report, which
appeared in eight parts over several years, in a provision of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 211, 48 Stat. 881, 909,
repealed by Pub. L. No. 100-181, tit. 3, § 330, 101 Stat. 1249, 1259 (1987).
26. 2 SEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 1.
27. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 684.
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At the time, advocates of group litigation reform naturally would have
looked to bankruptcy law for guidance, because the dynamics of group
resolution had received a great deal of academic and legislative attention in
reorganization cases. The SEC Report had prompted Congress to overhaul
the bankruptcy laws in 1938. The resulting legislation, the Chandler Act,28
marked a complete break with the former operation of corporate
reorganization law. Prior to the Chandler Act, corporate reorganizations
had operated through equity receiverships, a nineteenth-century confection
created by judges and lawyers that was later codified but largely
unchanged.29 A receivership comprised three basic building blocks: (i) the
court-ordered appointment of a receiver (a form of prejudgment attachment
in which a third party was placed in control of the debtor’s assets, thereby
preserving the assets from dissipation); (ii) the organization of “protective
committees” to represent and bargain on behalf of various classes of those
with claims against, or interests in, the debtor; and then (iii) the sale of the
debtor’s assets in a stylized (and usually fictional) auction at which
protective committees would successfully bid, using the assembled claims
of creditors as currency.30 Although a receivership took the formal
appearance of the seizure and sale of the debtor’s property to satisfy
creditors, it developed in practice into a method for negotiating the
reorganization of a corporate debtor’s financial distress.31 The sale
terminated the debtor’s prior obligations and replaced them with a new
capital structure negotiated during the receivership as part of a plan of
reorganization.
1. Control and Corruption in Group Representation
In Kalven and Rosenfield’s day, New Deal reformers had targeted
reorganizations for sustained criticism because of the perceived mismatch
28. 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978).
29. See generally Jeffrey Stern, Failed Markets and Failed Solutions: The Unwitting
Formulation of the Corporate Reorganization Technique, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 783 (1990)
(describing the development of the equity receivership).
30. Paul D. Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders’ and Stockholders’
Protective Committees; Reorganization Committees; and the Voluntary Recapitalization of
Corporations, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF FINANCING, REORGANIZATION, AND REGULATION
153, 157–81 (1917) [hereinafter SOME LEGAL PHASES] (setting out in detail the stages of an
equity receivership). Before the sale, the various protective committees would assemble into
a single reorganization committee holding the vast majority of claims against the debtor. See
James Byrne, Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages, in SOME LEGAL PHASES, supra at 77, 142.
Because the reorganization committee could bid its claims but an outside bidder would have
to put up a large cash bid, the reorganization committee typically became the only possible
purchaser of the debtor’s assets. See Frank, supra note 1, at 554–55 (explaining that “while
theoretically the judicial sale is an open sale at public auction, actually there is only one
possible purchaser—the reorganization committee”). A newly organized entity would serve
as the vessel holding the “purchased” assets.
31. As the Supreme Court described the process, a receivership had become “the
machinery by which arrangements between the creditors and other parties in interest are
carried into effect, and a reorganization of the affairs of the corporation under a new name
brought about.” Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883).
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between the interests of widely dispersed creditors and the actions of a
concentrated group of professionals who ran the receivership process. The
receivership system was derided as corrupt and ineffectual. It was corrupt
because insiders—corporate managers, their bankers, and their lawyers—
were said to control the process for their own benefit at the expense of
creditors.32 It was ineffectual because the protective committees were said
to fail in effectively representing their constituents.33 In a typical
receivership, the professionals organizing the case would solicit, say,
individual bondholders to give their proxy to the committee representing
that particular class of bonds.34 A bondholder who dissented from the
resulting plan of reorganization negotiated by the committee could
withdraw that proxy.35 But New Deal critics viewed this elaborate dance as
a sham because individual security holders were likely to be too
unsophisticated to make a meaningful choice in authorizing the formation
of the committee or in evaluating the resulting plan of reorganization.36
And once control had been given over to the committee, the investor had
little say in the outcome of the reorganization. An investor who withdrew
his securities from the committee would likely receive little or nothing in
the reorganization and have to pay an assessment to the committee to
boot.37 In the words of one prominent critic, the process led to “the foisting
of unfair plans upon masses of innocent investors, helplessly unorganized,
or hopelessly uninformed.”38
The SEC Report elaborated on why reorganization committees had so
often failed to protect the interests of the security holders they represented.
First, the report noted the lack of sophistication of many creditors in
corporate reorganization cases. Thus, the committee system was ineffective
when creditors were “uninformed and unskilled in the intricacies of
finance.”39 Second, the report posited that investors had little incentive to
32. In pressing their objections to the receivership system, reformers deployed case
studies of receiverships and the apparent self-dealing by the professionals who controlled the
reorganization process. See, e.g., MAX LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS 120–30 (1933)
(describing the conflicted relationships among managers, bankers, and lawyers involved in
the receivership of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad). The SEC
elaborated on a variety of benefits that insiders gained from the process—what the agency’s
report termed “the emoluments of control.” 1 SEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 4. These
emoluments included fees paid out of the debtor’s estate.
33. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 32, at 187–95 (giving examples of the control exercised
by reorganization professionals over protective committees).
34. The actual mechanism required the bondholder to deposit securities with the
committee in accordance with a deposit agreement, which in turn authorized the committee
to undertake various actions in the reorganization process. Paul Cravath, a leading
reorganization lawyer of his day, provides one of the most detailed accounts of the formation
of committees and the operation of deposit agreements. See Cravath, supra note 30, at 161–
74.
35. See id. at 168. The dissenter nevertheless had to make a contribution toward the
expenses incurred by the committee.
36. See Alfred B. Teton, Reorganization Revised, 48 YALE L.J. 573, 573 (1939).
37. 8 SEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 310.
38. See Teton, supra note 36, at 573.
39. 2 SEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 1.
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monitor the conduct of committees when an individual investor’s
“investment is so small that it becomes either impossible or improvident for
him to expend the funds necessary to prosecute his claims or defend his
position.”40 In essence, the report explained that many creditors in
bankruptcy cases held negative value claims that they had little economic
incentive to pursue.41
These criticisms of the committee system of group organization in
reorganization cases were not new. Indeed, the principal author of the SEC
Report, William O. Douglas, had written a Harvard Law Review piece that
outlined similar concerns three years earlier.42 Douglas’s article, which
focused on railroad reorganization cases, described the committee system as
valuable but prone to abuse without reform.43 Because of the low stakes
held by a typical claimant, insiders could foist themselves on the group and
gain control of the committee system for their own benefit. He proposed
curbing the power of insiders—such as the debtor’s managers and
bankers—in order to give committees of small security holders a real voice
in the reorganization process.44
Douglas explored various methods of ensuring a more vigorous and
democratic committee system. He made a favorable reference to a proposal
by Professor Roger Foster that would have treated the process of committee
formation much like the formation of a government in a democratic
republic.45 Claimants would elect from a slate of nominees in an open
process their representatives to exercise control during the negotiation of a
plan of reorganization.46 An agency could serve as a check against selfdealing during the process.
In Douglas’s view, then, the committee system would benefit from a
leader to champion the interests of small stakeholders and check the power

40. Id.
41. William O. Douglas, the principal architect of the SEC Report, had noted in an
earlier law review article that the perceived dysfunction of protective committees could be
attributed in large part to the fact that many creditors held negative value claims in
reorganization cases. See William O. Douglas, Protective Committees in Railroad
Reorganizations, 47 HARV. L. REV. 565, 567 (1934) (“In the first place, it took no great
understanding of the mysteries of high finance to make obvious the futility of spending a
thousand dollars to get a thousand dollars—or even less.”).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 567–68.
45. See id. at 586–87. Foster’s proposal was emphatic if vague:
Let machinery be provided for bondholder election of representatives by plurality
or majority vote, or by cumulative voting, with open or closed primaries, with
requirement that candidates disclose, or free themselves from, inconsistent
interests; place limits upon campaign expenditures, et cetera. Then give the
representatives thus chosen the power to bind their whole class by the bargain they
will make.
Roger S. Foster, Book Review, 43 YALE L.J. 352, 357 (1933).
46. See Douglas, supra note 41, at 586–89.
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of insiders.47 He distrusted the motives of private lawyers but was
otherwise agnostic about the ideal form of this champion.48 Douglas
suggested that a private group, “permanently organized for respectable and
competent patrol duty,” might come forward to serve that role.49 He also
suggested that a government agency could step in as watchdog, although he
labeled that an “extreme step” less favorable than increased committee
democracy.50
2. Agency Supervision and the Demise of Group Representation
Despite these proposals, the eventual reforms enacted by Congress did
not invigorate committees, install checks and balances against insider
control, or harness the powers of representative democracy. Instead, the
Chandler Act largely sidetracked committees in favor of what Douglas had
once called the “extreme step” of agency supervision.51 Rather than
resolution of a firm’s financial distress through an elaborate dance of group
negotiation, the Chandler Act substituted a system of agency-supervised
(although still court-centered) reorganization. Chapter X of the Chandler
Act was the statute’s showpiece. That provision, designed for the
resolution of large firms with publicly held securities, recast the
reorganization process.
The statute denied formal recognition to
committees representing creditors during bankruptcy proceedings.52
Indeed, the statute limited the ability of ad hoc committees to solicit
claimants in support of a plan of reorganization.53 At the same time,
bankruptcy rules adopted at the instance of the SEC required extensive
disclosures by ad hoc committees.54 In place of the incumbent management
of the debtor acting together with protective committees, Chapter X cases
47. As his article explained, the lack of adequate leadership dampened any chance of
mobilization by small stakeholders. See id. at 567 (“[T]he usual result was that this widely
diffused and disorganized minority never mobilized, because of their inertia, lack of
adequate leadership, or otherwise.”).
48. Douglas complained of reorganizations “effectuated by an incompetent and piratical
group of the legal profession who as often as not did the security-holders even more
disservice than would the old management or financial group.” See id. at 567.
49. Id. at 568. Douglas gave the Shareholders’ Protection Association, an English
organization, as an example upon which a suitable private watchdog group could be
modeled.
50. Id. at 584.
51. For a discussion of the approach to corporate reorganization taken by the Chandler
Act, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 119–23 (2001).
52. Although committees had no formal role under Chapter X, the statute contemplated
that committees might still be formed in some cases and receive compensation from the
debtor’s estate. See Chandler Act § 242, 52 Stat. 840, 900 (1938) (repealed 1978); see also
Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors’ Committees, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 1547, 1558 (1996).
53. Chandler Act §§ 175–176, 52 Stat. at 891.
54. Rule 10-211 in Chapter X cases required “detailed” disclosures to ensure greater
control of “the personnel and activities of those acting in a representative capacity”—a
provision intended to close off the reemergence of protective committees in disguise.
13A LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 10-211.03 (14th ed. 1977).
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were to be controlled by a neutral and independent trustee, acting with the
expert assistance of the SEC.55 The trustee had the sole authority to
formulate a plan of reorganization, although he could accept the input of
creditors or other stakeholders in the case.56
While a Chapter X bankruptcy remained a case brought before a court,
the statute gave the SEC a favored role in the process. The agency could
examine the financial condition of the debtor and opine on any proposed
plan of reorganization—in fact, a plan could not be considered by the court
until the SEC filed its report assessing it.57 And no plan of reorganization
could be sent to creditors for their approval unless the proposed plan was
accompanied by the SEC’s view of its merits.58 Chapter X’s basic premises
were twofold: first, individual claimants could not effectively organize
themselves into committees that served a meaningful function in
reorganization cases; and second, the process of reorganizing a distressed
firm was not a matter of group bargaining but a matter of careful study by
neutral experts knowledgeable in the solutions to corporate and financial
maladies.
How did it come to pass that proposals for beefing up the role of
committees turned into legislation that hobbled them? The short answer is
that the SEC Report had been received as a dossier on the futility of a
robust committee system. The lessons of the report were that widely
scattered small investors had little incentive to monitor the development of
a large firm’s reorganization, and that their indifference left the committee
system open to inevitable commandeering by insiders.59 Rather than taking
seriously the opportunity for greater representative democracy in the
selection of committees, or for the creation of a watchdog with the limited
role of monitoring the formation of committees, Congress took a more
aggressive approach. It removed the problems of committees by removing
the committees altogether.
B. From Bankruptcy Reform to Class Action Reform
Kalven and Rosenfield embraced the SEC Report’s insights and
abstracted from them more general claims about group litigation. In their
article, they compared a creditor in bankruptcy to an employee with a wage
and hour claim, a shareholder with a small securities fraud claim, a taxpayer
55. Chandler Act § 156, 52 Stat. at 888.
56. Id. § 167, 52 Stat. at 890.
57. Id. § 173, 52 Stat. at 891.
58. Id. § 175, 52 Stat. at 891.
59. The statute treated small business bankruptcies differently. In a separate provision,
Chapter XI, the Chandler Act provided for the creation of creditors’ committees in cases
seeking an “arrangement” of the debtor’s financial affairs. Chapter XI was designed for the
reorganization of firms with trade creditors but without publicly held securities. See SKEEL,
supra note 51, at 162–63. The drafters of the Chandler Act apparently assumed that, unlike
small investors such as bondholders, trade creditors had the savvy and the economic
incentives to play a meaningful role in the debtor’s reorganization. See SEC v. Am. Trailer
Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 613–14 (1965).
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challenging an illegal assessment, and a businessman with a modest
antitrust claim. They argued that each aggrieved claimant, “like the
investor in the reorganization, finds himself inadvertently holding a small
stake in a large controversy.”60 The SEC’s description of the isolated and
helpless claimant, they asserted, “applies equally well” to these situations.61
So it is not surprising that the authors also embraced the SEC Report’s
skepticism of group representation through committees.
As they
forthrightly acknowledged, “the committee is in considerable disrepute at
the moment” because “the tremendous volume of experience with
reorganization committees during the depression years was
disillusioning.”62 They summed up the prevailing wisdom about the use of
committees in group resolution: “In brief, in the one type of case in which
the committee has been used extensively, it has been tried and found
wanting.”63
Because committees had been so completely discredited at the time of
their writing, Kalven and Rosenfield understandably looked elsewhere for a
model of group litigation. The model they developed called for essentially
no participation by members of the group.64 Instead, a single, selfnominated representative would prosecute the case on behalf of the group.
In keeping with the era, Kalven and Rosenfield turned away from tinkering
with democracy and reframed the institutional design question of group
representation as solely about the choice of expert representative in
litigation. The choice they presented was between a public agency and a
private lawyer.65 In light of the lessons they drew from the SEC Report,
one might have expected them to favor the agency representative over the
private lawyer. Indeed, they referred approvingly to the SEC’s role in
Chapter X cases as an example of the superiority of an agency to a private
lawyer in some circumstance.66 They noted that the “reorganization bar,
like the reorganization committee, was not altogether satisfactory in
discharging the semi-public responsibility thrust upon it by the
reorganization process.”67 Nevertheless, Kalven and Rosenfield recognized
that the private lawyer had a substantial monetary incentive to pursue
litigation that an agency might not pursue.68 Although they praised the
60. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 684.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 689.
63. Id.
64. They distinguished the class action from a committee structure by the role played by
claimants during the litigation. See id. at 691 (“The chief difference between this method and
the committee method is simply that instead of mobilizing the plaintiffs prior to trial, their
participation in the case is deferred until a decision is reached.”).
65. Id. at 715.
66. Kalven and Rosenfield cited the “activity of the SEC in reorganizations under
Chapter X of the Chandler Act [a]s further evidence” of the “distrust of the competency of
private litigation to determine adequately questions of public importance.” Id. at 719 &
n.101.
67. Id. at 719.
68. See id. at 717–18.
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trend of “genuinely excellent” legal staffs at agencies,69 they harbored some
doubts about the limitations of public enforcement of rights due to the
inevitable limitation of resources experienced by agencies and the lack of “a
true civil servant attitude in America.”70 The answer, they suggested, was
not to rest exclusively on either public agencies or private lawyers but to
draw from both for the enforcement of rights.71
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit had a profound influence
on the version of Rule 23 promulgated in 1966. The reframing of the
categories of class actions and the creation of an opt-out class can be traced
to their criticisms of the 1938 version of the Rule.72 They also clarified the
basic justification of class actions reflected in the 1966 Rule: that the
device could serve to protect rights that might otherwise be unenforced due
to negative value claims and the limited resources of public agencies.73 At
the same time, the move away from committee representation was ensured
by their assessment of the failings of the pre–New Deal bankruptcy process.
II. RETHINKING GROUP REPRESENTATION IN BANKRUPTCY
Ironically, the modern bankruptcy process has largely undone the New
Deal era reforms on which Kalven and Rosenfield drew. With the 1978
Bankruptcy Code74 (and, in particular, the provisions of Chapter 11 of the
Code that govern the reorganization of firms), Congress turned away from
the basic design of bankruptcy adopted in the 1930s. Today, a business
reorganization in bankruptcy looks like a pre–New Deal reorganization in
significant respects. A trustee is not required in most Chapter 11 cases, and
therefore the incumbent management of the debtor remains in possession of
the business during the case.75 Creditors, and sometimes equity holders, are
represented by a system of officially recognized committees.76 These
committees play a role in monitoring the debtor and negotiating the
formulation of a plan of reorganization. The SEC no longer hovers above
as a pervasive supervisor.77

69. Id. at 718.
70. Id. at 720–21. Their principal fear was the continued existence of patronage
appointments in government agencies. See id. at 720.
71. Id. at 721.
72. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 380 n.89, 385 n.114 (citing Kalven and Rosenfield,
supra note 13, favorably in discussing the inadequacy of the previous version of the Rule).
73. See Nagareda, supra note 17, at 603.
74. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C.).
75. The debtor in possession has (with limited exceptions) the powers and obligations of
a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006).
76. See id. § 1102(a).
77. The U.S. Trustee program, which is housed within the Department of Justice, serves
a much less intrusive monitoring function in Chapter 11 cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2006)
(setting forth the duties of the U.S. Trustee). In large business reorganization cases, the
agency’s most prominent role is often that of watchdog over the compensation of
professionals. Id. § 586(a)(3)(A).
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A. Agency Supervision and Its Discontents
The story of why those reforms were abandoned after forty years is
instructive.78 By 1978, Chapter X was seen as a failure. It was too slow
and inhospitable for its intended job of reorganizing large firms. Those
firms that could get away with doing so sought to squeeze themselves into a
separate part of the Chandler Act originally designed for small businesses.
Under that competing provision, incumbent managers were allowed to
remain in possession of the business and creditors’ committees played an
active role in negotiating the debtor’s fate.79 In part this slow undermining
of Chapter X resulted from politically imposed constraints—the SEC lacked
the resources to perform its assigned tasks in bankruptcy cases because of
restrictive budgets.80
But the abandonment of the New Deal model of bankruptcy
reorganization can also be seen as a reassessment of the role of individual
claimants in bankruptcy. Recall that the Chandler Act reforms, informed by
the SEC Report, viewed the pre–New Deal system of creditor
representation as a sham.81 Those reforms were premised on the perception
that widely dispersed claimants were unlikely to play a meaningful role in
the process, and so committees invited usurpation by conflicted insiders.
Better, then, to discard the committees and impose powerful experts to
supervise the reorganization in order to protect small investors. That
assumption became less persuasive over time in the decades after the
Chandler Act’s enactment.
While the old protective committees may have opened the process to
excessive insider control, the committees also played another crucial
function. They served as facilitators of group resolution in business
reorganizations. For a variety of reasons—both historical and practical—
the American process of business reorganization in bankruptcy remains
court centered. We speak of bankruptcy “cases” that are filed in court and
presided over by judges. But the bankruptcy process at its core is a process
of negotiation.82 Formal adjudication plays a limited role in even the most
Instead, bankruptcy involves a
complex business reorganization.83
complicated, multipolar process of group resolution. A debtor seeking to
reshape its capital structure will need to take into account the positions of
multiple parties in interest, each potentially a source of cooperation or
contestation.

78. See SKEEL, supra note 51, at 160–83; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Welcome Back,
SEC?, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 573, 574–76 (2010).
79. This alternative, simplified form of business bankruptcy was contained in Chapter
XI of the Chandler Act. See supra note 59.
80. See SKEEL, supra note 51, at 170–71 (explaining the budgetary constraints imposed
on the SEC beginning in the Eisenhower administration).
81. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
82. Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 92
(2004).
83. Id.
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Chapter X, on the other hand, made effective resolution more difficult
because it was not a process designed to facilitate negotiation. At bottom,
the drafters of the Chandler Act viewed business reorganization as a matter
of agency expertise and not group negotiation.84 The reality of resolving a
firm’s financial distress, however, showed that assumption to be unsound—
or at least incomplete.
Even among those claimants in a bankruptcy who might be considered
small and scattered, the creation of a representative committee could further
their interests for at least two reasons. First, some groups might contain a
mixture of claimants with different incentives to pursue their claims. A
group of unsecured creditors in a large bankruptcy case might comprise
some creditors with insignificant claims as well as creditors with substantial
claims. For example, a company’s unsecured creditors might include
bondholders with very large claims as well as creditors with small contract
claims. Treating all of those creditors as helpless or indifferent would
overlook the obvious benefits that could be realized by harnessing the
energy of those willing and able to represent the group as a way of
indirectly serving their own interests. If selected as representatives of other
creditors, they might benefit the larger group while pursuing their own
ends. Second, groups of creditors vary widely in their relative levels of
sophistication. A properly designed system of group representation could
draw on the savvy of some creditors in a way that would serve the interests
of a larger group of unsophisticated creditors. In other words, the very
heterogeneity of creditors in bankruptcy could be harnessed to protect the
interests of the group.
B. Returning Group Representation to Business Reorganization Cases
The current Chapter 11 process attempts to achieve what William O.
Douglas had suggested before he wrote the SEC Report—a more vigorous
and independent committee to represent creditors. Under the Code, the
U.S. Trustee, an administrative agency, appoints a committee of unsecured
creditors comprising holders of the largest claims against the debtor.85 The
U.S. Trustee acts as a neutral entity responsible for selecting the members
of the committee (and also for deciding whether additional representative
84. The conception of the bankruptcy process embodied in the Chandler Act is reflected
in the comments of Jerome Frank after the statute’s enactment. In response to complaints
about the intrusive role of the SEC in bankruptcy cases, Frank rejected the proposition that
reorganizations are a matter of private litigation. Instead, he insisted that a “reorganization is
something more than a brawl, and that it is an administrative problem in the solution of
which the public, as well as the litigants, has an interest.” Jerome Frank, Epithetical
Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U. L. REV. 317, 321–22 (1941).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006). The office of the U.S. Trustee sends
questionnaires to the largest creditors disclosed on the debtor’s schedule of creditors
submitted when the debtor files a Chapter 11 petition. The questionnaire asks whether
creditors would like to serve on the committee of unsecured creditors. See Roberta A.
DeAngelis & Nan Roberts Eitel, Committee Formation and Reformation: Considerations
and Best Practices, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2011, at 20, 20.
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committees are warranted). The office typically selects creditors based on
the size and nature of their claims.86 In turn, the members of the committee
are fiduciaries for the larger group of creditors they represent.87 Thus, the
committee is expected to take a significant role in monitoring the debtor
and in negotiating the resolution of the case.88 The committee therefore
gains access to confidential and proprietary information about the debtor’s
affairs.89 It can investigate claims against the debtor’s managers or third
parties90 and seek permission to pursue those claims if the debtor refuses to
do so.91
The modern creditors’ committee sometimes acts as a mini-legislative
body expressing the voice of the larger group of creditors. Because courts
tend to place great weight on the views of the committee, its decision to
take a position in favor of, or against, a particular development in the case is
significant.92 A unanimous vote of a committee sends a very different
signal from a closely divided vote.93
This is not to say that the role of committees in bankruptcy cases is all
sweetness and light. Because official committees are granted both
significant information about the debtor’s case and a significant voice in its
outcome, a member of the committee may seek to commandeer it for purely

86. See Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical
Analysis of the Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 747, 763 (2011) (discussing the selection and composition of creditors’ committees).
87. See In re Firstplus Fin., Inc., 254 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). There is,
of course, disagreement about whether and to what extent the fiduciary model of the
creditors’ committee is appropriate. See Bussel, supra note 52, at 1562–70 (comparing
fiduciary and quasi-legislative models of creditors’ committees).
88. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 401 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6357 (explaining that committees “will be the primary negotiating bodies for the formulation
of the plan of reorganization” and “will also provide supervision of the debtor in possession
. . . and will protect their constituents’ interests”).
89. See Harner & Marincic, supra note 86, at 763–64.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2) (providing that the committee may “investigate the acts,
conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s
business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter
relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan”). The three basic functions of a
creditors’ committee are to monitor the debtor’s operations, investigate potential claims
against insiders, and negotiate the plan. In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 154 B.R. 9, 12
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
91. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creds. of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics
Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 580 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (concluding that a creditors’
committee has standing to bring a fraudulent conveyance claim that the debtor in possession
declined to pursue).
92. See Harner & Marincic, supra note 86, at 764.
93. To give a prominent example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York granted a contested motion to transfer venue in the Patriot Coal bankruptcy when
the committee voted 4–3 to oppose the motion. In re Patriot Coal Corp., 482 B.R. 718, 724
n.5, 755 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). When a similar motion was denied in the Enron
bankruptcy, the committee had voted unanimously to oppose it. In re Enron Corp., 274 B.R.
327, 345 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he Court finds it relevant to weigh the position of the
Committee in its statutory role as a fiduciary to and representative body of the unsecured
creditors.”).
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self-interested reasons.94 More fundamentally, the ancient concerns about
committees that are formed more for the benefit of reorganization
professionals than of represented claimants still linger.95 The issue of
committee control, in other words, has not been resolved in all cases.
Relatedly, the rise of claims trading in bankruptcy has produced the
phenomenon of committees that play a significant role in bankruptcy cases
despite a lack of formal recognition. It is not uncommon for sophisticated
hedge funds to buy up tranches of smaller claims and then seek to have
their voices heard in the case under the guise of an “ad hoc” committee of
claimants.96
But turning from the world of bankruptcy to the world of aggregate
litigation suggests that bankruptcy is much richer, relatively speaking, in its
appreciation of the variety of choices in group representation. The class
action remains molded by the conceptual framework of Kalven and
Rosenfield, and that framework gives short shrift to group representation
outside the single lawyer acting on behalf of the group without further
input. In a world that has moved beyond aggregation through the class
action, however, that conceptual gap presents an opportunity for different
approaches to representation.
III. THE HELPLESS GROUP IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION
What, then, of group representation in aggregate litigation more
generally? The possibilities of more flexible arrangements in the class
action may be limited. But the new world of nonclass aggregation presents,
perhaps, greater room for enhanced claimant representation.
A. The Problem of Group Representation in the Class Action
The problem of claimant representation in the class action stems first
from the emphasis on negative value claims as ideally suited for class
resolution. The idealization of the negative value claim—Kalven and
Rosenfield’s contribution—rests on the notion that class members are
rationally indifferent to the prosecution of their claims. Indeed, Rule
23(b)(3) requires a court considering the certification of a damages class to
weigh the class members’ interest in individually controlling their
94. See Harner & Marincic, supra note 86, at 763–67 (observing that a “self-interested
committee can skew the court’s and outside parties’ perspectives of the Chapter 11 case and
foster a resolution that might not maximize value” and giving examples).
95. In a recent case, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware disqualified
counsel from representing a creditors’ committee based on allegations that the attorneys had
manipulated the process of committee formation in order to assure their retention as
committee counsel. In re Universal Bldg. Prods., 486 B.R. 650 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
96. The principal question presented by these ad hoc committees is whether they should
disclose their members’ economic interests. See In re N.W. Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 701,
701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). Whether these committees should have fiduciary duties in
bankruptcy cases is another contested question. See generally David L. Perechocky, Should
Ad Hoc Committees Have Fiduciary Duties?: Judicial Regulation of the Bankruptcy
Market, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 527 (2012).
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claims97—a factor that favors the certification of negative value claims.
When class members’ claims appear to be more valuable, however,
certification is disfavored on the view that separate actions would be
preferable.98 Indeed, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor the Supreme
Court acknowledged that “[w]hile the text of Rule 23(b)(3) does not
exclude from certification cases in which individual damages run high, the
Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the rights of
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to
bring their opponents into court at all.’”99
Although that reasoning flows from Kalven and Rosenfield’s emphasis
on rights enforcement as the true function of the class action, it greatly
diminishes the possibility of group representation in the class action. It
presents as a necessary result of the decision to aggregate that claimants
will exercise no role in the case. Or, to put the logic somewhat differently,
it holds that only the helpless group deserves the benefits of aggregation.
But it is odd to say that the possibility of some enforcement of rights
without aggregation negates the benefits of aggregation. To be sure, the
group with negative value claims may receive the most benefits from
aggregation, but that does not mean that a group with more valuable claims
deserves none of those benefits.100 In a typical bankruptcy, the group of
unsecured creditors may include, say, individuals with potentially valuable
claims. That possibility would not be invoked to dismiss the need for a
committee of unsecured creditors to represent the group. Of course, in
bankruptcy, the need for aggregation in the first instance is taken as a given.
The proper form of representation is a separate question of institutional
design. The class action, on the other hand, collapses those analytically
distinct questions into a single inquiry.
The development of a more stringent commonality threshold for class
certification presents a second barrier to group representation in the class
action. The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,101
arguably diminishes the variance or “spread” among class members with
respect to their individual characteristics. If class members must be
uniform in more dimensions, it is harder to justify the need for some form
of group representation. Combined with the preference for negative value

97. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A) (providing that “the class members’ interests in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions” is a factor in
determining whether to certify the class).
98. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
99. Id. (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
497, 497 (1969)).
100. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. made this point by
noting the saved transactions costs in a class action that would benefit class members, even
though their asbestos personal injury claims were not negative value claims. 527 U.S. 815,
882–83 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that the resolution of claims under the
proposed class action carried transaction costs of only 15 percent, while piecemeal litigation
imposed transaction costs of 61 percent).
101. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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claims, the tightening of commonality makes the potential benefits of group
representation in the class action context less plausible.
B. The Possibility of Group Representation in
Nonclass Aggregate Litigation
Freed from the conceptual and doctrinal constraints of the class action,
however, aggregate litigation presents the possibility of greater group
representation in litigation. Indeed, the very reasons for procedural
aggregation’s move beyond the formal boundaries of the class action
provide justifications for exploring greater group representation. There is
already a developing literature exploring some of the forms that group
representation might take.102 But it is worth considering why group
representation may provide greater benefits outside the class action. Three
features of the new world of nonclass aggregations in particular—the size
of claims, the variance in claimants, and the realities of settlement—invite
group representation.
The increased judicial scrutiny of class certification has caused the turn
toward nonclass aggregation. The difficulty of bringing a mass tort class
action after the Supreme Court’s Amchem and Ortiz decisions, for example,
left lawyers involved in that category of cases to find some other form of
procedural aggregation.103 In recent years, class action lawyers have
explored the construction of aggregate litigation through the use of
coordinated proceedings under the Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) statute
followed by a global settlement.104 Once the MDL process brings cases
presenting a common question of fact together for pretrial proceedings in
one forum, the judge presiding over the cases guides the litigation toward
settlement—a form of aggregation sometimes labeled the “quasi-class
action.”105 Certification of a class action is not required, because each
plaintiff whose claim is centralized in the MDL court has a separate action
and is separately represented by counsel.106 Negotiations among plaintiffs’
lawyers and their adversaries will then lead to a master settlement
agreement to govern the resolution of each plaintiff’s claim. Two of the
most prominent examples of this form of nonclass aggregation followed the
102. See, e.g., Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 15.
103. See id. at 94 (“The upshot of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., and of Congress passing the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA), is that few mass-tort cases will proceed as certified class actions.”
(citations omitted)).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) (permitting the transfer of cases that involve one or more
common questions of fact to a single judicial district for pretrial proceedings).
105. The judge may encourage the resolution of the litigation by a series of maneuvers,
including selecting and trying “bellwether” cases to test the strength of claims or defenses
and by choosing a steering committee of plaintiffs’ counsel to take the lead in the litigation.
Finally, the judge may seek to adjust the compensation of counsel for plaintiffs, even though
there is no express power to do so as in a class action. See generally Charles Silver &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of Managing Multi-district Litigations:
Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105 (2010).
106. To be sure, a single law firm may represent a large inventory of individual plaintiffs.
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Vioxx and Zyprexa mass tort litigations.107 In both litigations, the presence
of individual questions relating to each claimant’s harm, combined with the
high potential value of their claims, defeated certification of a standard class
action.
1. Positive Value Claims
The features of nonclass aggregation that present stumbling blocks to
class certification, however, also make the possibility of group
representation more attractive. First, consider the presence of positive value
claims. The likelihood that some claimants hold valuable claims that could
be pursued separately weighs heavily against certification of a mass tort.108
But the presence of claimants with high dollar claims raises the
likelihood that a group of claimant representatives will have a heightened
interest in the litigation. Much as a creditors’ committee in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy case may comprise those creditors with particularly valuable
claims against the debtor, a claimant committee in a mass tort litigation
might seek out a similar composition. The role such a committee could
play is wide ranging: it could act as a voice of the larger group of claimants
or simply as a locus for greater cooperation and communication among
claimants.109
2. Nonuniformity
Second, consider the lack of uniformity across claimants in nonclass
aggregate litigation. In the class action context, greater variance among
claimants decreases the likelihood that the group will satisfy the level of
cohesion required for certification under Rule 23. In the Vioxx litigation,
for example, class certification was doomed by the presence of individual
harm and causation differences across the group alleging injury from the
drug.110
A somewhat variegated group of claimants, however, may nevertheless
make use of group representation. Again, recall that in a Chapter 11 case,
the official committee of unsecured creditors may reflect a variety of
creditor characteristics.
The creditors’ committee of an industrial
corporation, for example, might comprise bondholders, major vendors,
toxic tort claimants, and labor representatives. That variety enhances the
usefulness of the committee, because the committee’s deliberations may

107. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 608–10 (E.D. La. 2008)
(describing the background of the litigation); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp.
2d 488, 490–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same).
108. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
109. For a detailed account of some of these possibilities, see Burch, Litigating Together,
supra note 15.
110. See In re Vioxx Prods Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 458–63 (E.D. La. 2006)
(denying class certification).
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help to test whether potential fissures among various claimants are actually
significant.111
3. Settlement
Finally, the reality of settlement in nonclass aggregate litigation provides
another opening for group representation. The end goal of recent MDL
mass tort litigation has been a master settlement reached after negotiation
between plaintiffs’ lawyers and their adversaries.112 Procedural rules
should recognize the realities of litigation practice, and that should mean an
appreciation for the negotiation of a global resolution in nonclass aggregate
litigation.113 The negotiation of a global resolution is a key role of the
committee structure in business reorganizations.114 It is not hard to imagine
a similar role for a claimant committee in nonclass aggregate litigation. A
limited participation right of group representatives at the settlement stage
could serve to ease the formulation of a settlement scheme acceptable to the
broadest cross section of claimants.115
CONCLUSION
While the modern class action was conceived as the protector of helpless
groups, the emerging form of nonclass aggregate litigation does not need to
follow that conceptual path. Concern about group helplessness in aggregate
proceedings may confuse and confound rather than enlighten. Indeed, the
history of business reorganization law in the twentieth century is a story of
the mistaken overemphasis on the helplessness of claimants and the
eventual correction of that mistake.
The possibilities of group
representation should not be overlooked on the assumption that the group is
simply unable or unwilling to protect itself. Rather, a realistic assessment
of the composition of groups in nonclass aggregation suggests that some
form of group representation, like that in business reorganizations, is viable.
Particularly when the group includes claimants with high value claims, the
group is variegated in its characteristics, and settlement is the end goal of
litigation, group representation may provide a benefit to claimants as a
whole.

111. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the weight given to a
committee’s position when the committee is unanimous or divided).
112. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
113. See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for
Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 578 (2011).
114. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
115. See Bone, supra note 113, at 614–24.

